Resumo

It is recognized that the paths to sustainability and environmental preservation begin with collective and individual decisions, materialized in cooperative attitudes with a view to ensuring collective well-being. Based on this premise, this paper discusses individual decisions and their unfolding consequences for sustainability from the perspective of game theory and behavioural economics. The proposed scenario for this discussion refers to the context of professional fishermen, subsisting on fishery for food and marketing directly from the Itaipu hydroelectric power plant reservoir.

The reservoir was considered a public good. In order to foster cooperation among individuals, part of the specialized literature suggests the use of economic incentives, such as reward and punishment mechanisms, while another part emphasizes the influence of contextual factors and the individual´s dependency on the public good will determine their behaviour. The research problem can be described as: How do fishermen cooperate to the preservation of the reservoir from which they derive their livelihood, considering the influence of economic incentives in the form of punishments and rewards?

Theoretical foundation was based on the discussion about how the punishment mechanisms – for non-cooperative behavior – and reward – for cooperative behavior – can influence the decision of individuals. In addition, the paper discusses how some contextual factors, such as historical issues and dependency on the public good, may be decisive for cooperation.

Economic field experiments were carried out with professional fishermen from the fishing colonies located throughout the municipalities bathed by the Itaipu reservoir. The game of public good had two possibilities of treatment: punishment and reward. As for the experiment design, the design between groups was chosen, in order to establish comparisons from the aggregated data of each group. After the statistical analysis, and with the results, field in-depth interviews, with four people considered relevant to understanding the context of the fishermen groups, were conducted.

Among the main findings, it is mentioned the dependency of the fishermen group on the reservoir and the nature of work interfering with the donated amounts, which means that punishment and reward mechanisms had no effect on the fishermen. Besides, it is observed the influence of the group´s social norms, implicit, and related to the form of individual behaviour in the face of actions of appropriation by others; and that the fishermen deposited coins in the reservoir preservation account due to their high dependency on the same.

A public good problem was addressed, and it was noted that the determinants for the donations (cooperation) for the fishermen were related to their dependency on the reservoir. This finding was credited to the group´s disbelief in the forms of monitoring and inspection and their perception of inefficiency of penalties and fines, as a result of their life experiences. In addition, it was found that the group´s reduced use of punishment was controlled by fear of retaliation and exposure, and the wish not to be punished in future, for the practice of an occasional selfish action, breaking a rule.

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